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quirement so that defendants may appeal from either the motion for new
trial or judgment and sentence. The rules for Oklahoma criminal and civil
appellate practice would then be identical on this point. Furthermore, ap-
pellate review should no longer be confined to allegations of error raised in
the motion for new trial, if one is filed. This rule, especially in its applica-
tion, has worked hardships on defendants whose trial attorneys have not re-
called and recounted alleged trial errors to the satisfaction of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.92 The court has other theories of review available to
dispose of trial irregularities, for example, a failure to object, to move to
suppress evidence, or to request instructions, overwhelming evidence of guilt,
and the harmless error doctrine. Eliminating the motion for new trial as a
method for limiting appellate review will not necessarily increase a defend-
ant's chances for relief. It will, however, promote consistency in results, re-
duce confusion to practicing attorneys, and encourage confidence in the
Oklahoma criminal appellate process.
Anne M. Moore
Domestic Relations: Oklahoma's Live-In
Lover Statute: § 1289(D) of Title 12
Since 1965 the Oklahoma statutes have provided for downward modifica-
tion or termination of support alimony in the event of either spouse's death
or the recipient's remarriage.' In 1979 the Oklahoma legislature added a third
92. It can be argued that limiting appellate review to errors raised in the motion for new trial
forces criminal defense attorneys to do a better job of representing their clients at trial. On the
other hand, many criminal defendants in Oklahoma qualify for court-appointed attorneys, some
of whom have little experience in criminal law and no incentive to develop better skills. Further-
more, the goal of improving client representation must be balanced against the cost to the de-
fendant who suffers when his attorney does not understand the rules of criminal appellate pro-
cedure relating to the motion for new trial. Unlike the defendant in a civil case, the criminal
defendant stands to lose his liberty, and perhaps even his life, if his attorney forfeits trial errors
through procedural default.
Perhaps the goal of improving the quality of client representation could be met if the Court
of Criminal Appeals were more willing to grant appellate relief based on a finding that the
defendant was inadequately represented at trial. In Johnson v. State, 620 P.2d 1311 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1980), the court abandoned the farce and mockery standard for judging ineffective
assistance of counsel and adopted a reasonably competent assistance of counsel standard. No
defendant in Oklahoma has ever successfully pursued an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
at least not in any published decision. A new trial was granted to the defendant in Smith v.
State, 650 P.2d 904 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) on grounds that appear to be ineffective assistance,
but the court raised the error itself after appellate counsel, who was also trial counsel, failed to
do so. No appellant has met the "heavy burden" required, even under the lower standard the
court has adopted. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 659 P.2d 362, 365 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
1. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289 (1981).
[Vol. 36
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
NOTES
basis for modification: voluntary cohabitation of a former spouse with a
member of the opposite sex.2 In Roberts v. Roberts,3 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court recently construed this newly established ground for modification.
This note challenges the constitutionality of the so-called "live-in lover"
statute on the basis of equal protection violations. It also suggests that the
applicable case law demonstrates that the Oklahoma Supreme Court is show-
ing more interest in a moral philosophy than in dispensing justice.
Purpose and Scope of Section 1289(D)
Presumably the Oklahoma legislature added cohabitation as a basis for
reducing or terminating alimony to equalize the previous disparate treatment
between financially emancipated alimony recipients who cohabit without
remarrying and those who do remarry." Although this may be a legitimate,
even a desirable, state objective, the goal could and should have been effec-
tuated by language far less broad than the statute employs. The statute pro-
vides:
The voluntary cohabitation of a former spouse with a member of
the opposite sex shall be a ground to modify provisions of a final
judgment or order for alimony as support. If voluntary cohabita-
tion is alleged in a motion to modify the payment of support, the
court shall have jurisdiction to reduce or terminate support
payments upon proof of substantial change of circumstances
relating to need for support or ability to support.5
If the intent of the legislature was to put cohabiting alimony recipients on
an equal footing with remarried alimony recipients, application of the statute
should have been expressly limited to a former spouse who is a recipient of
alimony and cohabits with a member of the opposite sex. In its present
language, the payor of alimony who cohabits with a member of the opposite
sex may invoke the statute. Thus, as was pointed out in a recent law review
article,6 a payor whose ability to pay diminished because of his cohabitation
with a member of the opposite sex may ask the court to reduce or terminate
his obligation to pay alimony.
Because the classification of persons into categories can imply inequality,
the equal protection clause operates as a limitation on permissible legislative
classification.7 To determine whether a classification is reasonable, it is
necessary to look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. Afford-
2. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289(D) (1981).
3. 657 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1983).
4. Id. at 157 (Opala, J., concurring).
5. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289(D) (1981).
6. Comment, The Effect of Third Party Cohabitation on Alimony Payments, 15 TULSA
L.J. 772, 786 (1980).
7. For a general discussion of the equal protection clause, see Tussman & tenBroek, The




ing relief to a payor whose ability to pay is reduced because of his own
cohabitation is clearly unrelated to the purpose of the live-in lover statute.
Even if the courts avoid this fundamental unfairness by refusing to reduce
or terminate the obligation in such a circumstance,' the statute nevertheless
fails in its attempt to equalize the status of cohabiting and remarried alimony
recipients because it provides only for reduction or termination of alimony
payments.9 When a recipient of alimony remarries, the former spouse's duty
to support terminates,'0 but at the same time the new spouse assumes the
duty to support." When a recipient of alimony chooses to cohabit rather
than remarry, however, the former spouse's duty to support may now be ter-
minated, but the paramour does not assume the duty to support.'2 If the
paramours end their relationship, the former recipient has no recourse
against either the former spouse or the former lover and must look to the
state for any additional support that is needed.
To avoid this situation, the legislature should have provided that alimony
be suspended or waived during the cohabitation so long as the need for sup-
port is reduced.'3 Should the paramour move out, however, the payor would
resume the obligation to support the recipient. Only then would the statute
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective.
Because the statute does not limit the basis for modification to cohabita-
tion of the recipient spouse,"' and because the requisite change of cir-
cumstances may relate to the ability to support as well as the need for sup-
port," the statute is too broad to bear a rational relationship to the state's
purported goal of affording relief to an alimony payor whose recipient has
become financially emancipated. The United States Supreme Court in Orr v.
Orr'6 assumed forthrightly that "if upon examination it becomes clear that
there is no substantial relationship between the statutes and their purported
objectives, this may well indicate that these objectives were not the statute's
goals in the first place."' 7
8. The court is of the opinion that even if the statute contains unfair elements, it must apply
it anyway: "It is the duty of courts to give effect to legislative acts, not to repeal or circumvent
them. A court is not justified in ignoring the plain words of the statute. [Citation omitted.]."
Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Okla. 1981). Since the wording of the statute is so
plain, presumably the court will not ignore it.
9. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289(D) (1981).
10. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289(B) (1981).
11. 32 OKLA. STAT. § 3 (1981).
12. Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla. 1981).
13. This was suggested by Justice Doolin in Smith v. Smith: "When the cohabitation has
ceased, the court should modify support alimony only for those times when the cohabitation,
and hence the need for support alimony, was viable." 652 P.2d 297, 300 (Okla. 1982) (Doolin,
J., dissenting).
Tennessee's corresponding statute provides for suspension only. TENN. COD ANN. §
36-820(a)(3) (1977).
14. The statute reads: "The voluntary cohabitation of a former spouse with a member of the
opposite sex . . . 2" 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289(D) (1981) (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
17. Id. at 281 n.10.
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If relief to the alimony payor is not the legislature's goal, it appears that
Justice Simms was correct when he concluded in his dissenting opinion in
Roberts that, "The provision is not concerned with need, but sexual
conduct."'8 Cohabiting recipients "are penalized by this provision in the ex-
ercise of their rights to privacy, and freedom of association in their own
homes for behavior which is lawful and wholly unrelated to the purpose of
alimony for support."'9
Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases
Although the 1983 case of Roberts v. Roberts" was the first case to which
the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the live-in lover statute to be applicable,
earlier cases set the foundation for the court's position. In the 1981 case of
Allgood v. Allgood,2' the former husband asked that the court terminate his
obligation to pay alimony because his former wife was living with her
boyfriend. The court noted that section 1289(D) did not affect the parties in
this case because they were divorced before the amended provision became
effective.22
Implicit in the court's conclusion was that section 1289(D) acts prospec-
tively only.23 Consequently, all alimony recipients divorced before October 1,
1979 are free to cohabit and accept support from their paramours without
jeopardizing the right to receive support from their former spouses. Further,
Allgood suggests that although a husband has a legal duty to support his wife
that can continue after divorce in the form of support alimony, a paramour
has no such corresponding duty either during the cohabitation or
afterward.2 Once the cohabitation ends, if the alimony has been terminated,
the court is without jurisdiction to order either the former spouse or the
former paramour to resume or continue contributing support to the former
recipient.
Though section 1289(D) requires proof of a substantial change of cir-
cumstances relating to the need or the ability to pay, the legislature did not
see fit to include guidelines in the statute. That leaves the courts as the sole
determiners of what constitutes a substantial change. The prevailing test for
economic need in states having statutory provisions for modifying alimony
based on change of circumstances is the test defined by the New Jersey
Superior Court in Garlinger v. Garlinger.2' The Garlinger test acknowledges
two situations where there may be a change of circumstances sufficient to
entitle the alimony payor to relief: (1) where the recipient former spouse is
being supported in whole or in part by her paramour, or (2) where the
18. Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153, 159 (Okla. 1983).
19. Id. at 158.
20. Id. at 153.
21. 626 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1981).
22. Id. at 1325.
23. This later became an explicit ruling in Smith v. Smith, 652 P.2d 297, 298 (Okla. 1982).
24. Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla. 1981).
25. 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (1975).
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paramour resides with the recipient without contributing toward food or nor-
mal household bills.26 In the latter situation, there may be a reasonable in-
ference that the alimony is being used, at least in part, for the benefit of the
paramour.27
In Allgood, the Oklahoma court cited Garlinger in supporting the hus-
band's contention that the alimony should be terminated based on his former
wife's changed circumstances.28 The court distinguished Garlinger on the
basis that New Jersey had a statute providing for modification for change in
circumstances, but Oklahoma did not.2 9 Because the court merely
distinguished Garlinger and did not comment on the desirability of the test
pronounced therein, it is possible that the Garlinger test may yet be adopted
to determine whether a change of circumstances is substantial enough to af-
ford the alimony payor relief.
Finally, the court noted in Allgood that section 1289(D) does not respond
to those situations wherein the alimony recipient receives aid from someone
outside the conjugal relationship, e.g., parents, a sibling, or roommates of
the same gender.31 In this remark, the majority implies that section 1289(D)
is underinclusive. Of course, the legislature is free to remedy a general prob-
lem in a piecemeal fashion without subjecting the statute to constitutional in-
firmity. If the implied underinclusiveness of section 1289(D) was not a hint
of a constitutional problem, Allgood suggests the court's receptiveness to an
even more extensive statute that would afford relief to an alimony payor
whose recipient's need diminished because of aid received, for example, from
her parents.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's next opportunity to comment on the live-
in lover statute was in the 1982 case of Smith v. Smith.3' The implicit ruling
in Allgood32 that section 1289(D) is prospective only became explicit in Smith
when a much divided court held that the section does not apply to grants of
support alimony imposed prior to the enactment of the statute.33 In his
special concurrence. Justice Opala agreed with the plurality in holding that
the statute is only prospective in nature."' Justice Simms also filed a special
concurrence, but did not indicate whether the statute should be applied only
to grants of alimony imposed after its enactment." The remaining four
justices dissented. In order for a case to set a binding precedent, five justices
26. Id., 347 A.2d at 799, 803.
27. Id. It is beyond the scope of this note to examine whether the payee's use of the money is
constitutionally protected as a fundamental privacy right.
28. Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Okla. 1981).
29. Id. at 1326.
30. Id. at 1327.
31. 652 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1982).
32. Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Okla. 1981).
33. Smith v. Smith, 652 P.2d 297, 298 (Okla. 1982). The statute became effective October 1,
1979. Justice Wilson, writing for the plurality, was joined by Chief Justice Irwin and Vice Chief
Justice Barnes.
34. Id. at 299.
35. Id. at 298, 299. Justice Simms would strike § 1289(D) as unconstitutional.
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must concur in the result. In Smith, only four justices indicated agreement
with the specific holding; accordingly, the holding is not binding on future
cases.
Justice Doolin wrote for the majority in Allgood3 wherein the court noted
that section 1289(D) had no effect on a support alimony award granted
before the statute was enacted.37 In Smith, however, he authored a strong
dissent to the contrary,3 stating that although section 1289(D) cannot be
retroactively applied to "terminate support alimony due and owing prior to
October 1, 1979, ' 39 support alimony that becomes due and owing after that
date is subject to termination under the statute."0 He persuasively reasoned
that:
A judgment, particularly a support alimony judgment, calling for
periodic payments, may fix or define vested property rights but
usually is not ipso facto a vested right in itself. Otherwise the
Legislature could not have allowed for the termination of support
alimony upon the death or remarriage of the recipient, or upon
the voluntary cohabitation of the recipient . . .. Each payment
becomes vested only when due, and not before.
Because this reasoning is the sounder approach, one can hope that it will at-
tain majority status the next time the court considers the issue. Justice Doolin
went on to suggest that:
When the cohabitation has ceased, the court should modify sup-
port alimony only for those times when the cohabitation, and
hence the need for support alimony, was viable. The object of the
statute should not be to punish the spouse who cohabits with a
member of the opposite sex; the aim is to allow modification of
support alimony when need for such has decreased or ceased to
exist. We cannot, and will not dictate our personal moral
philosophy."
Although there is no statutory provision to modify support alimony on a
temporary basis, or to reinstate or increase such after it has been terminated
or reduced, suspending payments for only the time when need for support
has decreased or ceased to exist would better serve the purpose of the statute.
This assumes, of course, that the purpose is to grant relief to alimony payors
whose recipients no longer need the support.
Justice Opala's special concurrence suggests that section 1289(D) is un-
necessary, that the court already had the power to terminate support alimony
36. Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1981).
37. Id. at 1325.
38. Smith v. Smith, 652 P.2d 297, 299 (Okla. 1982).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 299, 300 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 300.
19831
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on the basis of cohabitation under section 1289(B), which provides for ter-
mination upon remarriage:
A nonspousal union based in a common household may create a
bond of economic interdependence that bears all the earmarks of
a matrimonial partnership. When interposed for the purpose of
terminating support alimony, such bond should be treated as a de
facto remarriage within the purview of 12 O.S. 1981 § 1289B."3
It is unclear what Justice Opala means by the phrase "de facto
remarriage." Black's Law Dictionary defines de facto as "in fact, in deed,
actually,""' then goes on to explain that the phrase is used to characterize "a
state of affairs which must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is il-
legal or illegitimate." ' What is clear is that Justice Opala advocates that the
law recognize cohabitation as the equal of remarriage, at least for the pur-
pose of alimony modification. The question then arises: If such a bond were
treated as a de facto remarriage for purposes of termination of support
alimony, would the bond receive the same treatment for purposes of deter-
mining whether the duty to support exists under section 3 of Title 32 of the
Oklahoma Statutes? If it were, the plight of the alimony recipient whose
lover moves out after the support alimony has been terminated would be
solved. Logically, then, the state would simply charge the paramour with the
duty to support. However, because Justice Opala has already advanced this
proposal in at least two cases without so much as a comment from his
brethren, '6 it is doubtful that his view will attain majority status in the pre-
sent court.
In January 1983, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma squarely addressed the
live-in lover statute in Roberts v. Roberts."7 In that case the former husband
filed an application to modify the support alimony award granted in the
divorce decree on the grounds that there had been a substantial change in cir-
cumstances relating to the need for such support and that his former wife
was living in a "private conjugal relationship." The former wife appealed the
trial court's termination of the support alimony award.
The appellant alleged that the trial court erred in its finding of a substan-
tial change of circumstances that would warrant termination of support
alimony and that a private conjugal relationship existed."' She also attacked
the statute as being violative of due process and equal protection.9
Without even noting the facts, the majority of the court agreed that the
43. Id. at 299.
44. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 375 (5th ed. 1979).
45. Id.
46. Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153, 157 (Okla. 1983); Smith v. Smith, 652 P.2d 297, 299
(Okla. 1982).
47. 657 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1983).
48. Id. at 154.
49. Id.
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trial court had spent "considerable time examining the evidence and listening
to the witnesses and absent an abuse of discretion this Court will not reverse
a discretionary decision by a trial court based on the evidence."50 The court
did not address or pronounce a standard to be used by the trial courts
because the appellant did not argue that an improper test had been applied.51
Although the court did not provide guidelines for determining when a
change of economic need is substantial enough to merit reduction or termina-
tionof support alimony, the court implied what it would consider a "private
conjugal relationship" by finding that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in its factual finding, The dissent detailed the facts that the
majority did not: The appellant and her boyfriend had spent twenty nights
together over a period of approximately six months,5 2 an average of less than
one night per week. If a change of financial need is this easy to prove, sup-
port alimony is indeed easily jeopardized.
Appellant further urged that the statute is violative of due process and
equal protection because it does not allow a party the right to seek an in-
crease in support alimony upon showing substantial change of circumstances.
Moreover, the described cohabitation penalizes only the payee, not the payor
who also engages in such conduct.53
To the former allegation, the court answered that it has no power to in-
crease the original support award because there is no statutory authority to
do so.- Concluding that there is nothing unconstitutional in section
1289(D),5 the court called appellant's latter argument ludicrous. After all,
said the court, "what possible bearing would that have on the need for sup-
port of the recipient spouse?"' 56 The dissenting opinion answered the majori-
ty by pointing out that "sexual conduct-by either former spouse-has no
bearing on the recipient's need for support."'7
Before the live-in lover statute was enacted, the only grounds for modifica-
tion were death or remarriage of the recipient.58 Both directly related to need.
50. Id. at 155.
51. Id. at 158 (concurring opinion). Thus, it is possible that at some later date the Garlinger
test will be adopted.
52. Id. at 160 (dissenting opinion). Compare the definition of cohabitation in connection
with common-law marriage:
That parties occupied [the] same room, or bed, overnight, does not constitute "co-
habitation" as [this] term is employed in connection with common-law marriage,
but, with respect to such marriage, the word means a living or residing together of
a man and woman ostensibly as husband and wife, and ordinarily carries with it
the idea of a fixed residence, and does not contemplate a casual sojourning
together.
In re Miller's Estate, 182 Okla. 534, 78 P.2d 819 (1938) (emphasis added).
53. Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153, 154 (Okla. 1983).
54. Id. at 154-55.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 161.
58. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289(A), (B) (1981).
1983]
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Section 1289(D) in some instances may relate to need." As Justice Simms
pointed out in dissent, the payor's ability to support is irrelevant in all other
circumstances because the purpose of support alimony is the need of the re-
cipient. 0 Yet when cohabitation is involved, the issue assumes sudden
relevance."I
Justice Simms further explained that in order to support the notion that
section 1289(D) is based on need, "it would be necessary to satisfactorily
show that sexual activity in a cohabiting relationship represents a sufficiently
legitimate, accurate proxy for financial need.'"'2 Because such conduct is
wholly unrelated to need, Justice Simms concluded that the classification is
gratuitous and therefore unconstitutional.
3
Constitutionality of Section 1289(D)
The dissent in Roberts analyzed the unconstitutional elements in section
1289(D).' Equal protection is, of course, the guarantee that persons in
similar circumstances will be dealt with in a similar manner and that people
of different circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same.' The
live-in lover statute violates both of these rules.
For example, an alimony recipient who is supported by her wealthy
paramour but does not share his residence is similar to the alimony recipient
who shares living expenses with her live-in lover. Although both have a
reduced need for support alimony, the statute does not treat them in the
same way. The recipient of support alimony with a paramour who has
enough money to give financial assistance while maintaining separate
households may in fact be in less need of continued support alimony than the
recipient who must cohabit with her lover out of financial necessity, yet only
the latter is subject to reduction or termination of the alimony. In other
words, the statute discriminates against those who decide to cohabit for the
reason of financial necessity.
In a special concurrence in Roberts, Justice Opala opined that the
classification is permissible because it provides similar treatment for married
and unmarried alimony recipients who are similarly situated." The fault of
this reasoning lies in the fact that remarried recipients have new spouses who
are legally obligated to support them,'7 but the unmarried recipients have no
59. For example, when one of the former spouses cohabits and the recipient's need is re-
duced, a change in the recipient's need is not a requirement because of the alternate provision
"or ability to pay." In fact, the movant need only allege voluntary cohabitation in his motion to
modify. Id. § 1289(D).
60. Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153, 159 (Okla. 1983).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 160.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 159-61.
65. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344
(1949).
66. Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153, 157 (Okla. 1983).
67. See 32 OKLA. STAT. § 3 (1981).
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one with such an obligation.6 This fact makes the two groups of recipients
dissimilar, yet both the statute and the court in Roberts treat them as if they
were the same.
When these disparities are added to the possibility that a payor who
cohabits and has a reduced ability to pay may be relieved from his duty to
pay support -alimony, the statute creates on its face a classification unrelated
to its purpose. Support alimony is designed to provide maintenance for the
dependent spouse. Once the individual becomes self-supporting, the payor
should be released from the obligation to provide support. The live-in lover
statute creates a class of alimony recipients who are subject to having their
support terminated. In order for this statute to be constitutionally permissi-
ble, the class of recipients must be related to the purpose of the statute, that
is, the recipient must no longer be financially dependent upon the payor. The
class of recipients in the live-in lover statute includes recipients who are still
financially dependent, but whose payors have a diminished ability to con-
tribute to the recipient's support. As the dissenting opinion in Roberts stated,
the classification does not satisfy even the lenient rational relationship stan-
dard, much less the stricter test requiring, as here, that where a fundamental
right is involved, only a compelling state interest could justify the statute.
6 9
Conclusion
As it is presently written, Oklahoma's live-in lover statute violates the
equal protection clause and is therefore unconstitutional. Although the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held to the contrary in Roberts, not only was the
court divided but the appellant advanced weak arguments. The appellant
based her attack on the statute on the grounds that it does not allow for up-
ward modification upon substantial change of circumstances and that it
penalizes payees who cohabit but not payors who cohabit. A better strategy
would have been to show the court how the impermissible classification
created by the statute is not related to the purpose of the law, that is, the
statute both includes persons it should not and fails to include persons it
should. Because the court was so divided, it is at least possible that if and
when a valid equal protection challenge reaches the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the live-in lover statute will be stricken as unconstitutional.
A provision for termination or, even better, suspension of alimony based
on need could be made without an impermissible classification. The Ten-
nessee statutes provide a useful and desirable model:
In all cases where a person is receiving alimony in futuro and the
alimony recipient lives with a third person, a rebuttable presump-
tion is thereby raised that:
68. Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla. 1981). Justice Opala's opinion may be
justified since he expresses the view that there is a de facto remarriage, provided, of course, that
if there is a de facto remarriage, the paramour has a duty to support both during and after the
cohabitation.
69. Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153, 159 (Okla. 1983).
19831
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